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THE TREE OF EXPERIENCE IN THE FOREST OF INFORMATION:
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INFORMATION

Abstract:
Standard economic models assume that the weight given to information from different sources
depends exclusively on its diagnosticity. In this paper we study whether the same piece of
information is weighted more heavily simply because it arose from direct experience rather than
from observation. We investigate this possibility by conducting repeated game experiments in
which groups of players are randomly rematched on every round and receive feedback about the
actions and outcomes of all players. We find that participants’ actions are influenced more
strongly by the behavior of players they directly interact with than by those they only observe.
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weak-link, behavioral economics.
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“Experience is a dear teacher, but fools will learn at no other” Benjamin Franklin
1. Introduction
Information often comes from multiple sources. Standard economic models assume that
people weigh different sources according to their diagnosticity. Holding diagnosticity constant,
how a specific piece of information was obtained should be irrelevant.
One important distinction, when it comes to the process leading to acquisition of
information, is whether the information was obtained through personal experience – i.e., in a
process that had or could have had direct consequences for oneself -- or only by observing the
experience of others. We refer to the former as "experienced information" and the latter as
"observed information."
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It has long been hypothesized that experienced information, by virtue of being more
emotional, concrete and proximate has a greater impact on behavior than observed information
(Nisbett and Ross, 1980). As we summarize in some detail later, however, existing research has
either failed to find support for such a difference, or it has found it but with research designs that
are subject to confounds such as differences in informational content, format or relevance. In
this paper we present results from repeated game experiments that vary the dimension of
experience while maintaining content, format and relevance constant. We find that experienced
information does have a greater impact on behavior than observed information. Indeed, in two
of our three experiments we find that only experienced information has a statistically significant
influence on behavior, even when observed information is equally informative.
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Although the vast majority of information people obtain can be classified as either experienced or observed, some
cannot, such as new information that arises from mentally processing exiting information, be it experienced or
observed, or information which is obtained from fictional situations, or from sampling without payoffs. In this
paper we focus exclusively on the contrast between observed and experienced information
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All three experiments employed the same basic paradigm. Groups of subjects
participated in several rounds of a game, the Weak-link in experiment 1 and the Prisoner’s
Dilemma in experiments 2 and 3. Subjects were randomly assigned to subgroups that played
independently of one-another. In every round, each of the subgroups played the game once.
After every round, each subject observed the actions of all participants in all subgroups.
Subjects were then reassigned to new subgroups (again randomly formed) for the next round.
This process was repeated until the end of the experiment.
The key feature of these experiments is that they vary only whether information is
experienced or observed, maintaining content, format and relevance of information constant. All
subjects see the actions taken by all other subjects, presented in the same format, and because of
the random rematching from round to round, all actions are equally relevant to everyone -equally diagnostic of what they can expect to encounter in the future.
Because subjects played in subgroups, however, a given action was directly experienced
by some subjects (those in the same subgroup) but only observed by others (those in other
subgroups). If experienced information has a greater impact on behavior than observed
information, then subjects’ actions should respond more strongly to the actions of subjects in
their previous subgroup than to those in other subgroups.
Consistent with this prediction, we find that in the Weak Link experiment, subjects
responded roughly twice as strong to the actions of players in their previous group than to actions
of players in other groups, while in the Prisoner Dilemma experiments we find that only
experienced information has a significant impact on behavior.
Two possible mechanisms could account for a behavioral premium on experienced
information. People may simply not attend to observed information (i.e., it is essentially not

4

really observed), or they may attend but not respond to it (i.e., it gets weighted less). We attempt
to distinguish between these two explanations in experiments 2 and 3. In experiment 2, after
subjects repeatedly played a prisoner dilemma game with different partners, but were informed
of the actions of other players, we asked them to recall how many of the subjects they did not
interact with defected. Their answers were highly accurate, suggesting they attended to the
actions of players they were not directly paired with. However, their own subsequent play was
influenced only by the person they had just interacted with. In experiment 3 after each round
subjects wrote down the actions of all subjects on a piece of paper. This guaranteed that subjects
attended to the observed information and yet, as in study 2, only experienced information was a
significant predictor of behavior. Taken together these experiments strongly suggest that the
behavioral premium placed on experienced information is caused by placing a greater weight on
it, rather than to lack of attention to observed information.
In studying the dynamics of behavior in experimental games, our experiments are related
to the learning literature within experimental game theory. This literature seeks to explain the
sequential choices of people playing strategic games (for a review see chapter 6 in Camerer,
2003). It traditionally distinguishes between two main types of learning: simple-reinforcement
(where the tendency to take a future action depends on how profitable it has proven in the past)
and belief-based (where future actions are influenced by how profitable different actions would
have been, had they been taken in the past).
Camerer and Ho (1999) proposed a model called “Experience-Weighted Attraction”
(EWA), which, by combining both types of learning in a parsimonious way, successfully
accounts for behavior across a broad range of games (see also Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002).
Particularly relevant to this paper, the authors used EWA to estimate the relative impact on
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learning of actual payoffs vs. that of forgone payoffs. They find, across three different sets of
games, that the impact of the former is roughly twice that of the latter (Camerer & Ho, 1999).
This premium probably arises because simple-reinforcement has a greater emotional component
than belief-based learning (Camerer et al., 2005).
Note that both simple-reinforcement and belief-based learning rely on experienced
information, the former on decisions’ actual consequences, and the later on their counterfactual
ones. In this paper we propose that it is important to contrast the behavioral consequences of this
source of learning (experienced information) with another source, that which occurs by
considering the actual and counterfactual consequences of the actions of others (observed
information).
In what follows, section 2 summarizes earlier related research, sections 3, 4 and 5 present
results from the three experiments and section 6 concludes.

2. Related research
This section reviews several independent lines of research that are related to the question
of how people weigh directly experienced as compared with merely observed information. We
begin with the literature that utilizes field data to estimate the impact of personal experience on
preventive behavior. We then review experiments from the psychology literature that attempt to
contrast the influence of experienced and observed information, and finally we summarize the
experimental economics literature that studies the impact on behavior of observing other players
play the same game.
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2.1 Field evidence of personal experience and self-protective behavior
A large literature has examined the impact of personal experience on a variety of selfprotective behaviors. The findings from this literature vary across domains. For example, there
is no evidence that personal experience with accidents influences seat-belt use (see e.g. Svenson
et al., 1985; Weinstein 1987), there is mixed evidence as to whether direct experience with crime
leads to an increase in crime-preventive behaviors, such as leaving doors locked or purchasing an
alarm, (DuBow et al., 1979; Hough, 1985; Parker et al., 1980; Skogan, 1987; Svenson et al.,
1985; Tyler, 1980; Weinstein1987) and there is robust evidence that direct experience with a
natural disaster increases preparedness for future disasters (see e.g. Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001;
Kunreuther, 1978; Lindell and Perry, 2000; Schiff, 1977).
In the most comprehensive review of this literature, Weinstein (1989) – himself a
contributor -- points out that much of the existing research has been subject to serious
methodological problems, such as crude all-or-none measures of past experience, and the
common use of self-report measures of behavior as the dependent variable. Most importantly,
however, these studies only collect data on experienced information (e.g. whether or not
somebody was the victim of a crime) and not on observed information (e.g. whether they are
aware of the crime rate in the neighborhood where they live). Even if these field studies were
free of the methodological limitations pointed out by Weinstein, therefore, they could document
an effect of personal experience on behavior, but they lack the necessary comparison to
determine whether a premium is placed on experience.
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2.2 Psychology experiments contrasting the impact of experienced and observed information
A few papers have contrasted risk preferences when people receive descriptions of the
distribution of outcomes with when they experience a sequence of outcomes drawn from the
same distribution (see e.g. Barron and Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Yechiam et al., 2005).
These papers find that, consistent with prospect theory, choices based on descriptions are made
as if people overweighed small probabilities, but that choices made based on experience
underweight them. In these studies, unlike ours, information is not held constant across
conditions because subjects in the description-based condition received the objective distribution
of outcomes, while subjects in the experienced-information condition rely on their
(incompletely) sampled information. Indeed, differences in information across the conditions is
cited by the authors as one possible explanation for why people react differently to the two types
of information.
Lind, Kray and Thompson (1998) compared the effects of personal experience of unfair
treatment with reports of unfair treatment by others. Groups of three subjects interacted with a
“supervisor," a confederate, who in one condition behaved unfairly once with each of the three
members of the group, and in the other condition three times with the same member. The
authors found that groups with an equal distribution of unfairness (i.e. where all members had
experienced unfairness once) rated the supervisor as less fair. Lind et al. interpret this as
suggesting that “people place greater weight on their own experience of injustice than on that of
others” (page 17). However, the experiential and observational conditions also differed in ways
other than just on whether information was experienced or not; subjects who received the unfair
treatment knew more about it than subjects who only learned of it through a short conversation
(groups of three subjects had 2 minutes total to share their experience during a 20 minute
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experiment). In addition, the distribution of unfairness may be in itself informative: subjects
may have inferred that if only one of them felt the supervisor was unfair, the problem may lay
with the subject rather than the supervisor (in fact, this is one of the explanations proposed by the
authors).
Braver and Rohrer (1978) examined the degree of cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
game by participants who had previously played 20 rounds of the game against a confederate
who always played tit-for-tat, and by participants who had observed the same 20 rounds.
Observers were slightly more likely to cooperate than the actual players (in a new game), but this
difference was significant only under somewhat arbitrary specifications (overall cooperation rate
did not differ). However, this is an extremely weak test of the difference between observed and
experienced information. Unless the participant playing against the confederate switched actions
sufficiently often, neither the actor nor the observer would have been able to figure out that the
confederate was playing a tit-for-tat strategy.
Olsson and Phelps (2004) compared skin-conductance reactions to the presentation of a
target stimulus between subjects who had previously received electric shocks immediately
following the presentation of that stimulus and subjects who had observed a confederate receive
such shocks. They found a slight directional effect towards greater “learning” (i.e. greater
increase in skin conductivity) in the experiential learning condition, but this difference did not
approach significance. As was the case in previous experiments, informational content was not
maintained constant across conditions, however, since subjects experiencing the electric shock
(which was calibrated to be “uncomfortable but not painful”) knew more about what that shock
felt like than subjects who only observed a confederate receive such a shock, and hence (non-
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significant) differences in skin conductivity may have resulted from differences in informational
content rather than in the process by which information was obtained. 2

2.3 Observational learning studies in experimental economics
A few experimental economics papers have studied the impact of observing others play
on learning. Schotter and Merlo (2003) had one set of subjects engage in multiple attempts to
solve a task with one correct answer, while another set of subjects watched. All subjects then
participated in a similar task (the only difference was greater stakes). The performance of
observers in the high-stakes task was actually better than that of those who had practiced.
Schotter and Merlo speculated that their results may be due to the fact that players only pay
attention to their realized payoffs while observers pay more attention to counterfactual payoffs
because they are engaged in a more abstract processing mode (this interpretation of their findings
is consistent with earlier results by the same authors, Merlo and Schotter, 1999).3
Duffy and Feltovich (1999) compare the behavior of dyads playing ultimatum and bestshot games either in private or while observing (and being observed by) another dyad. They
obtained mixed results with respect to the impact of observing the behavior of others on
behaving closer to Nash equilibrium predictions (further from equilibrium in the ultimatum
game, no effect in the best-shot game). They speculate that differences in the content of
information across conditions may explain the mixed nature of their results. Since in the
condition where subjects observed others they themselves were being observed, differences

2

Olsson and Phelps were interested on whether learning occurred at all across different conditions and hence they
did not report the significance of the difference between experiential and observational learning in their paper.
Through personal communication with Andreas Olsson we learnt that this difference was not significant.
3
Note that if this was the only difference between experiential and observational learning we would not expect
subjects who are engaging in the same task (as they do in our experiments) to weigh experienced and observed
information differently.
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across conditions (and experiments) may be driven by the impact of being observed (e.g.
reputation concerns) rather than by that of observing. Ballinger, Palumbo, and Wilcox (2003)
ran experiments where overlapping “generations” of subjects made saving decisions. They
found that later generations, which observed (and received advice from) earlier ones,
accumulated savings that were closer to the optimum.
In sum, although several independent lines of research within both economics and
psychology have investigated issues that are related to the question at hand, most have
concentrated on studying whether experienced information influences behavior at all (in the
self-protective behavior literature) or whether observed information influences behavior at all (in
the experimental economics literature). The few studies that have contrasted experienced and
observed information, in the psychology literature, have not maintained all other aspects of
information constant across conditions, and hence their (mixed) results do not address the
question of interest here: does the same piece of information influence behavior differently
depending on whether it was experienced or observed?

3. Experiment 1 – Weak-link game
The first experiment employed the Weak-link (WL) game, first studied by (Van Huyck et
al., 1990). The WL is a coordination game in which all players simultaneously choose a number
between 1 and 7. Payoffs increase with the minimum of all the numbers chosen in a group, and
diminish with the distance between an individual’s choice and the minimum. Equilibrium arises
when all subjects choose the same number, because, conditional on everyone else choosing the
same number, no individual can be better off by choosing a different one. Players are not,
however, indifferent between the seven equilibria since the higher the number they coordinate
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on, the higher is the payoff to everyone. Table 1 shows the payoff structure of the game we
used, mapping the relationship between an individual’s choice, the minimum choice in the
subgroup and the individual’s payoff.

*** Table 1 ***

The WL game resembles several real-life group decision making situations in which the
member of a group exerting the least effort affects the outcomes of all members. A common
example is a lunch meeting that cannot begin until all participants have arrived. No one wants to
arrive before the last person arrives, but everybody is worse off waiting. Any arrival time can be
an equilibrium, as long as all participants manage to coordinate on simultaneous arrival, but
everyone arriving on time is the preferred equilibrium.
Several papers have looked at how people play the WL game (see e.g. Camerer and
Cachon, 1996; Camerer and Knez, 2000; Schotter and Merlo, 2003; Weber, 2006) . These
studies find that most people initially choose high numbers, but that groups of three or more
players converge towards lower ranked equilibria rather quickly, presumably as a consequence
of the fact that a few participants choose low numbers early on.
Because WL game participants appear to make current choices dependent on the
behavior of others in previous rounds, we thought it was an ideal game to use in a study
comparing experienced with observed information. Consistent with the notion that people place
a premium on experienced information, our prediction is that subjects' choices will be more
strongly influenced by the choices of their previous counterparts than by the choices of subjects
assigned to other groups, even though, due to random rematching in each round, the behavior of
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all subjects is equally relevant in terms of what subjects could expect to encounter in the next
round.
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3.1 Method
We ran the WL experiment at the Göteborg University in Sweden. Participants were
recruited from a pool of undergraduates who had signed up for participation in experiments. For
each session, we arranged with 16 subjects to come to the lab. The first 12 subjects to arrive were
part of the experiment and latecomers were asked to do another task in a separate room. The six
sessions we ran included a total of 72 subjects. Subjects sat in front of computer terminals where
they could not see other subjects’ screens. The experiment was web-based, run on a specially
programmed PHP script (instructions are included in the appendix).
After reading the instructions, subjects were presented with two hypothetical outcomes
for WL games, and were asked to calculate the payoffs that these games would have produced.
The experiment began only after everyone had correctly calculated these payoffs, showing that
they understood the game.
WL games were played independently by three subgroups consisting of four subjects
each. A player’s payoffs for any given round depended exclusively on the behavior of other
players in the same subgroup. At the end of every round, subjects were randomly re-assigned to
a new subgroup formed from the 11 other people in the room (including, but not limited to, the
people they had just played with), with their identities kept hidden. Figure 1 shows a screenshot
of the webpage on which subjects chose a number in the 1-7 interval by selecting the appropriate
digit from the pulldown menu.

**Figure 1**
In each round, after all participants had chosen their number, they all saw everyone’s
actions and were reassigned to a new subgroup. This process was repeated until the end of the
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experiment. Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the webpage that subjects saw between rounds.
After all l0 rounds were completed, one was randomly chosen to count for real money.

** Figure 2 **

3.2 Results
Figure 3 shows the distribution of choices for the 72 subjects through the 10 rounds.
Consistent with prior WL experiments, lower numbers become more common as the rounds
progress. Table 2 shows the average minimum per-round, which starts at 3.72 and ends at 2.61.

**Figure 3 ***

**Table 2**

Our key hypothesis is that subjects put more weight on the behavior of subjects in their
previous subgroup than on the behavior of subjects in other subgroups. To test this hypothesis,
we conducted two different analyses of the data. The first consisted of running regressions in
which the dependent variable was the choice of each subject on each round and the key predictor
was the minimum in the subject’s own-group in the previous round, controlling for the minima in
each of the three groups. It assesses whether people put more weight on their own group by
testing if the coefficient of the minimum of a subject's own group is significant.
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Although this strategy has the advantage of being simple and straightforward, it has the
disadvantage of utilizing only the minima in each group; it does not directly take into account the
choices of 8 out of the 11 other players.
The second strategy consisted of regressing subjects’ choices not on the minima of the
groups, but on a function of the subjective probabilities associated with each possible minimum
in the subject’s next group, probabilities which in turn depend on the choices of all eleven
players. The premium placed on experienced information is assessed by estimating the relative
weighting of the 3 choices in the subject's own group, relative to the 8 choices in the other two
groups, that leads to subjective probabilities that best match subjects’ actual choices.
In what follows we present the results from both strategies. The estimated premium on
experienced information is approximately the same in both: subjects behave as if they weighted
the behavior of subjects in their own group around twice as heavily as the behavior of subjects in
other groups.

3.2.1 Empirical strategy 1 – Using minima in previous round to predict behavior
We regressed the choice of player i in round k on the minimum choice in each of the
three subgroups in round k-1, plus a slope dummy for the group in which player i participated in
round k-1, and we controlled for the individual’s previous choice and for the round number in the
experiment. This regression is represented by equation 1 below,

bi,k = α0 +α1 bi,k-1 + α2 Min1,k-1 + α3 Min2,k-1 + α4 Min3,k-1 + α5 OwnGroupMini,k-1 +

(1)

α6 Round + α7Group1 + α8 Group2 + εi,k
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Where:
o bi,k is the number chosen by individual i in round k, (1-7)
o Minj,k is the minimum number in subgroup j, in round k (with j=1,2,3)
o OwnGroupMini,k-1 is the minimum number in the group where subject i
participated in round k-1.
o Round corresponds to the round number (2-10), and
o Group1 and Group2 are dummies which take the value of 1 if the subject was in
groups 1 and 2 respectively, and 0 otherwise. These dummies are added because
OwnGroupMin,k-1 can be thought of as an interaction between having played in a
specific subgroup and the minimum in that group, and hence the regression must
include the main effects as well.

If subjects do not make a distinction between the choices of players in their previous own
group and of those in other groups, α5 should be 0. This would mean that once we know the
minima in each of the three groups, it makes no difference which minimum was experienced by
the subject. If, on the other hand, subjects place a higher weight on their own subgroup, α5
should be positive.
Since the dependent variable is discrete and bounded we estimated Ordered Probit
regressions (we obtain qualitatively identical results via OLS). Because the regression includes
several choices for each individual we report clustered (by subject) standard errors. Table 3
shows the results from estimating this regression.
**Table 3**
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Column 1 only includes the minimum choice in the group where a subject played on the
previous round, and controls for the subject’s previous choice and for round number. The effect
of the own-group’s minimum is estimated as positive and significant (α5 = 0.119, p < .0001).
This result is analogous to the field studies reviewed previously, documenting an influence of
personal experience on preventive behavior.
Only after controlling for the minima in all three groups, however, can we interpret α5 as
indicative of subjects weighting experienced information more heavily than observed
information. In column (2), therefore, we control for the minima in all three groups and hence
the parameter estimate of α5 corresponds to a slope dummy testing whether individuals weight
the minimum of their own subgroup more heavily. As predicted own-group remains positive and
significant after controlling for observed information (α5 = .066, p = .042). 4 The coefficient
estimate suggests a sizeable impact of experienced information. According to the estimates from
column 2, individuals are nearly twice as sensitive to the minimum choice in a group they
previously participated in, than to the ones on which they did not. 5 For completeness,
column (3) presents the results if the slope dummy for own-group is excluded.
An interesting question is whether subjects' excessive reliance on experienced
information diminishes with experience. To address this question we estimated the regression
presented in column (2) separately for rounds 2-5 and rounds 6-10. The resulting point estimates

4

For those individuals who chose the lowest number in their subgroup in the previous round, we use the second

lowest value in their group as the key predictor, in order to avoid using their own past actions to predict their
behavior. Our results do not change if we use the second lowest choice in all subgroups for all subjects (α5=.093,
p=.018).
5

It is surprising that the point estimate of α3 is so much larger than those of α2 or α4. This may be in part the

consequence of group 2’s results being presented in the center of the screen. This highlights the potential role of
attention in our findings, which we address in experiments 2 and 3.

18

of α5 were .054 and .085 respectively, suggesting that, if anything, subjects increased the
weighting of their own group compared to that of others, although the change is not significant.
Alternatively, if the regression is estimated with an interaction term between round and the
minimum in a subject’s own group, the point estimate of such interaction is positive (B = .013),
though not statistically different from 0 (p = .28).

3.2.2 Empirical strategy 2 – Using subjectively expected minimum in next round to predict
choices
As noted, although strategy 1 is simple and straightforward, only 3 out of every 11
choices of other players are incorporated directly in its analysis. Strategy 2, in contrast, uses all
of them. The second strategy builds upon the logic that subjects’ choices should depend on what
they expect their groups’ minima to be in the next round, beliefs which, in turn, should be a
function of all 11 choices in the previous round.
The second strategy consists of estimating the hypothesized premium on experienced
information by computing the implicit weights placed on experienced and observed actions that
lead to subjective probabilities that best fit subjects’ actual choices.
In particular, suppose that, to estimate the probabilities associated with their group
minimum in the next round being equal to each of the possible seven values, participants
weighted each of the choices by the eight subjects not in their previous group (i.e. observed
information) by a weight of 1, and those of subjects in their own group (i.e. experienced
information) by a weight of θ. Strategy 2 consists of estimating the θ that leads to subjective
probabilities that best explain the observed actions. If subjects weighted experienced
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information and observed information equally, then θ=1 would maximize fit, while if subjects
only responded to experienced information, θ would be estimated as diverging towards infinity.
Let pi,k(mi,k|θ,Нi,k-1) represent subject i’s subjective probability that the minimum in her
group in round k, will equal m, with:
m ∈ [1,7], and
Hi,k-1 consisting the full history in the previous round (i.e. the actions of the other
11 subjects in the experiment in round k-1).

Intuitively subjects can be thought of as generating pi,k by drawing 3 balls (for the
corresponding 3 other players that will form their subgroup) from an urn where there are 8 balls
representing the 8 actions of subjects in the other two subgroups, and 3*θ balls representing the
experienced subjects.
For example, suppose that in one round, of the 11 other players, 10 chose the number
seven, and 1 chose the number one. Subjects from the group where a player chose one will form
subjective probabilities as if drawing from an urn where there are (8+2θ) balls with the number
seven and θ balls with the number one, while subjects from the other groups will draw from an
urn with (7+3θ) balls with the number seven and just 1 ball with the number one. Obviously, if
θ = 1 all subjects would assign the same subjective probabilities to each minima regardless of
which group they were part of in the previous round (in particular
pi ,k (1 | θ = 1, H i ,k −1 ) = 1 −

10 9 8
= .27 , for all i).
11 10 9

If θ > 1, on the other hand, subjects who were in the group were a player chose the
number one would have a higher subjective probability of the minimum in the next round being
equal to one, than subjects who were not in that group. For example, with θ=2, if subject i

20

participated in the group where the number one was chosen and subject j did not, their subjective
probabilities would be pi ,k (1 | θ = 2, H i ,k −1 ) = 1 −
p j ,k (1 | θ = 2, H j ,k −1 ) = 1 −

12 11 10
= .395 and
14 13 12

13 12 11
= .214 respectively.
14 13 12

To estimate the θ that best fits subjects' responses, one needs a function that maps these
imputed subjective probabilities into a [1-7] number. We estimated θ for three different possible
such functions:
(i)

the best response to the subjective probabilities (b*i,k) ,

(ii)

the expected minimum (E[mi,k]), and

(iii)

the seven probabilities themselves (pi,k(1|θ,Hi,k-1), pi,k(2|θ,Hi,k-1)…pi,k(7|θ,Hi,k-1)).

In particular, to estimate θ we computed, for different values of θ, the R2 from
regressions in which the dependent variable was a subject’s actual choice in each round, and the
predictors were the three transformations of pi,k(mi,k|θ,Hi,k-1) listed above. We chose as our
estimated true value of θ that which obtained the highest R2. The general specification of these
regressions can be characterized by equation (2):
bi,k = β0 + β1 Round + β2 bi,k-1 + β2 G[pi,k(m|θ,Hi,k-1)]+ εi,k

(2)

Where
bi,k is the number chosen by individual i in round k, (with bi,k ∈ [1,7])
G is one of the aforementioned three functions that map pi,k(mi,k|θ,Hi,k-1) into bi,k

The specific regressions, then, corresponded to the following three versions of
equation (2):
bi,k = β0 + β1 Round + β2 bi,k-1 + β3 b*i,k + εi,k

(2i)
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bi,k = β0 + β1 Round + β2 bi,k-1 + β3 E[min]i,k + εi,k

(2ii)

bi,k = β0 + β1 Round + β2 bi,k-1 + β3,1 pi,k(1|θ,Hi,k-1) +... β3,7 pi,k (7|θ,Hi,k-1) + εi,k

(2iii)

Figure 4 shows the R2 for each of these specifications, obtained for different values of θ.
The y-axis depicts the R2 and the x-axis the θ associated with that R2.

***Figure 4***

The R2 curve for specification (2iii) is the highest, which is not surprising given that it
uses 6 additional degrees of freedom. Somewhat surprisingly, curve (2ii) is above curve (2i),
suggesting subjects are not choosing the action that provides the highest expected payoff
conditional on their implied subjective probabilities.
Most importantly, consistent with the results obtained with strategy 1, the θ that
maximizes R2 of all three specifications is around 2. This means that subjects behave as if they
weighted the behavior of subjects in their group twice as heavily as that of subjects in other
groups.
This second approach also allowed us to estimate the negative consequences of placing a
premium on experienced information. In particular, one can compute the expected payoffs that a
subject would have obtained if she behaved according to θ=1 and compare this figure to her
actual payoffs. According to our calculations, on average, if we allow one subject to behave
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according to θ=1 while maintaining the actions of all other players constant, the expected payoffs
would have been 82.43 Swedish crowns, compared to the actual average of 72.85.6

4. Experiment 2 – Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In experiment 1 we analyzed a repeated WL game, and found support for the hypothesis
that people overweight experienced information. In experiment 2 we seek to replicate the results
using a different game, the PD. Consistent with the notion that people place a premium on
experienced information, our prediction is that subjects’ decision to defect or cooperate will be
more strongly influenced by the behavior of their previous counterpart, than by the behavior of
other subjects.
The PD possesses two advantages over the WL game. First, because subgroups in the
WL game had four players, each choosing from among seven possible actions, there is some
ambiguity in terms of what the relevant information was. This is highlighted by the need for two
different empirical strategies to analyze the results. In the PD game, in contrast, participants
choose between only two possible actions (cooperate or defect) and groups consist of only 2
players; experienced information in this case consists unambiguously of the binary choice of
previous opponents, while observed information consists of the choices of all other players.
The simpler structure of the PD game also allowed us to ask subjects to recall the
outcomes of the game. We used their answers to evaluate the possibility that our results are
driven by attention -- i.e. that subjects place greater weight on their own experience because they
do not pay attention to the outcomes of the other groups.

6

Very similar results are obtained regardless of how subjects are assumed to respond to p(m|θ), i.e. the greater
payoffs are not arising as a result of assuming subjects best-respond, but rather, from the equal weighting of
information.
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4.1 Method
A total of 54 subjects, recruited at MIT, participated in the experiment in exchange for
payment. There were a total of eight experimental sessions, three run with eight subjects, and
five with six subjects. Subjects were assigned to a personal computer on which they read the
instructions for the experiment. After everybody had finished reading the instructions, the first
round begun.
The procedure closely resembled that of the WL experiment. In each round subjects
chose to cooperate or defect (labeled A and B respectively). Once everyone had made a
decision, all subjects saw everybody’s actions and were then reassigned to a new randomly
determined counterpart. Figures 5 and 6 show screenshots of the web-pages on which subjects
entered their choices and observed the outcomes of each round, respectively. As shown in
figure 6, subjects learned of the choices of others by seeing the relevant cells in the payoff
matrices highlighted on their screens. For example figure 6 shows that in group 1, player 1
chose B, while player 2 chose A. Note that the choices of every subgroup, including the
subject's own, are displayed in the same format.

** figures 5 and 6 **

Figures 5 and 6 also show the payoff structure for the game: $8 for mutual cooperation,
$9 for defecting on a cooperator, $5 for cooperating with a defector, and $6 for mutual defection.
Experiments lasted at least 6 rounds, one of which was randomly chosen to count.7 At the end of
all rounds, students were asked to recall the total number of times choice B had been selected
7

Due to a problem with the PHP code, some experimental sessions ran for 8 rounds. We present the analyses
including only the first 6 in order to include the same number of rounds per experimental session. The qualitative
nature of the results is not affected if we include all rounds.
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across all subgroups. They were also asked to recall how many times their own past counterparts
had chosen B. We use their answers to these questions to see if subjects were paying as much
attention to the actions of subjects in other subgroups as to the action of the individual they were
directly paired with on a particular round.

4.2 Results
Table 4 shows the percentage of subjects who cooperated by round (it also presents
parallel figures for experiment 3, which will be discussed in the following section). As is the
case in most PD experiments, the proportion of subjects who cooperate drops as the experiment
progresses. Figure 7 shows the proportions of people who cooperate in round k, in experiment 2,
as a function of their previous action and the action of their previous opponent. There is a clear
interaction between the individual’s previous choice and the opponent’s: previous cooperators
are more likely to cooperate after interacting with another cooperator (86%) than with a previous
defector (64%) but previous defectors are less likely to cooperate after interacting with a
cooperator (15%) than after interacting with a defector (27%).

** Table 4**
** Figure 7 **

With this interaction in mind, we tested the hypothesis that individuals place more weight
on the behavior of the player they faced by estimating the following regression:

Owni,k = B0 + B1 Owni,k-1 + B2 % of Cooperators i,k-1 + B3 % of Cooperatorsi,k-1 * Owni,k-1 +

(3)
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B4 Experiencedi,k-1 + B5 Experiencedi,k-1 * Owni,k-1

All variables refer to whether the relevant individual(s) cooperated in a given round, in
particular:

•

Owni,k takes the value of 1 when individual i cooperates in round k, 0 otherwise

•

% of Cooperatorsi,k-1 is the percentage of subjects in other groups who cooperated
in the previous round, and

•

Experiencedi,k-1 takes the value of 1 when individual i experienced a cooperator in
round k-1, 0 otherwise

As was the case in the previous experiment, we use clustered standard errors by subjects
to correct for the fact that the data include multiple decisions by each subject.

** Table 5 **
Table 5 reports the parameter estimates for equation (3) estimated with a Probit
regression. Column 1 shows that defectors who faced a cooperator were less likely to cooperate
than defectors who faced a defector (B4 = -0.427, p = .119), while cooperators who faced a
cooperator were more likely to cooperate than cooperators who faced a defector (B5 = 1.159, p =
.003). The joint test that both B4 and B5 are 0 is rejected with p = .016. These results
demonstrate an effect of experienced information, however, only after controlling for aggregate
behavior can we interpret them as indicative of subjects weighting directly experienced
information more heavily than observed information.
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Column 2 shows that controlling for the aggregate cooperation rate, and its interaction
with a subject’s previous decisions, directly experienced information still matters, indeed, the
size of the coefficients is virtually unchanged. Cooperators who faced a cooperator are more
likely to cooperate in the next round (B5 = 1.150, p = .004), and defectors are somewhat less so
(B4 = -0.44, p = .105). 8 More importantly, the joint test for experienced information is rejected
(p = .021) while that for observed information is not (p = .542). For completeness, column 3
shows the influence of observed information, without controlling for experienced information. It
is noteworthy that even without controlling for experienced information, observed information
does not significantly predict subjects’ choices (p = .301).

4.2.1 Attention.
As mentioned earlier, at the end of each experimental session of the PD game, subjects
were asked to recollect:
(i)

how many of their partners cooperated, and

(ii)

how many of all subjects had cooperated

Their answers to these questions are useful for discriminating between two possible
mechanisms behind our results. One possibility is that subjects collect all the relevant
information and at the time of making a decision place a premium on the information they
experienced. Alternatively, subjects may simply not pay attention to the outcomes of other
groups and, since they don’t know what others do, their behavior is not affected by it. Both of
these explanations violate standard assumptions about how people use information, albeit
through different mechanisms.
8

As was mentioned earlier, some experimental sessions run for 8 instead of 6 rounds. If rounds 7 and 8 of those
session are included in the regression the results remain qualitatively unchanged (B4 = -.183, p=.012; B5=.396,
p<.001).
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To evaluate whether subjects paid attention to the outcomes of other groups we
conducted two simple tests. The first consists of estimating the following regression:
Estimatei = γ0 + γ1 Observedj + γ2 Owni + γ3 Experiencedi + εi,

(4)

where:
Estimatei is the estimated total number of cooperators by subject i (i.e. their answer to
question ii). 9
Observedj is the actual number of observed cooperators (i.e. not faced by the subject) in
session j.
Owni is the actual number of times subject i cooperated
Experiencedi is the actual number of times subject i’s counterparts cooperated

If subjects were perfectly accurate in their recollection of what others did, γ1 in equation
(4) would equal 1, since for every subject (not-paired with them) that defected, their total
recollection of defection should increase by 1. If, on the other extreme, subjects completely
neglected what others did, their total estimate of defection should be uncorrelated with the actual
defection rate and γ1 would equal 0.
The parameter estimates for γ1, γ2 and γ3 were 0.714, 0.742 and 0.921 (SEs = .414, .334
and .318, respectively). The R2 was 37.2%. Consistent with the hypothesis that participants do
pay attention to the actions of others, the null that γ1 = 1 cannot be rejected (p > .4) but the null
that γ1 = 0 can (p < .1). In other words, the null that participants do not pay attention to the
actions of other players is rejected, and the null that they are perfectly calibrated is not.

9

Note that each subject makes only one prediction because they participate in only one experimental session.
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The second test we employed to assess whether subjects paid attention to the choices of
subjects with whom they did not interact, consists of comparing the accuracy of their answers to
questions (i) and (ii). If subjects did not pay attention to the actions of others we would expect
their estimates of aggregate cooperation rates to be further off than their estimates of cooperation
rates from their previous partners. We measured accuracy by calculating the average absolute
error, in percentage terms. The average absolute error for question (i) was 11.5%, only slightly
lower than the 12.3% for question (ii). To assess whether these two measures were statistically
different, for each subject we subtracted the absolute error for (i) from the absolute error for (ii)
and tested whether this difference was significant (note that this difference is computed at the
subject level controlling therefore for subject-specific differences in overall recall). The test fails
to reject the null that subjects are equally accurate for answering (i) and (ii), p = .940.
Since subjects are quite accurate in the recollection of aggregate cooperation rates, it
seems that the impact of experienced information on behavior is not the result of simply ignoring
non-experienced information, but rather, of placing a premium on information that has been
experienced. Directionally speaking, however, the results presented above do suggest that
subjects were less calibrated with the actions of subjects they observed vs. those of which they
experienced and, hence, it remains a possibility that the premium placed on experienced
information is caused by differential attention.
In our third and final experiment we further assessed the potential role of attention by
asking subjects to write down the actions of all players in all groups after each round,
guaranteeing that they had attended to them.
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5. Experiment 3– Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with subjects writing down all actions
5.1 Design
The design of this experiment was identical to that of study 2 with the following two
differences: all sessions were run with 6 subjects at a time, and subjects were asked to write
down the actions of all 6 players in the 3 dyads after every round. By asking them to write the
actions down, we not only guarantee that they looked at them, but that they paid enough attention
to reproduce them on a piece of paper.
5.2 Results
Average cooperation by round is reported in Table 4 (together with the parallel values
from experiment 2). Cooperation rates were extremely similar across the two experiments. To
estimate the impact of experienced and observed information we conducted the same regressions
used for experiment 2. The results are presented in Table 6. Again, they are highly consistent
with the findings from study 2 (Table 5). Most importantly, column (2) shows that experienced
information (i.e. the action of the previous opponent) has a significant impact on a subject’s
likelihood to cooperate (p = .0004) but observed information does not (p = .2667), even though
subjects did pay attention to it, since they were able to accurately write them down.
The fact that we are able to replicate our findings when attention is no longer a plausible
explanation strongly suggests that experienced information is actually weighted more heavily
than observed information, rather than simply attended to more carefully.

6. Conclusions
In this paper we present results from three experiments in which subgroups of subjects
played several rounds of the Weak-link (WL) and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game. Subjects
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were given information about the decisions of subjects both in their own sub-group (experienced
information) and in the other subgroups (observed information). Because subgroups were
randomly determined in each round, the actions of all subjects in the previous round were
equally relevant and hence should have received equal weight. In contrast to this normative
prediction, in both games we found that subjects placed significantly more weight on the actions
of subjects they had experienced than on those they had simply observed.
In the WL game, subjects did respond to the actions of subjects in groups in which they
did not participate, but they responded roughly twice as much to subjects in their own previous
subgroup. In the PD, we found that subjects responded (at least significantly) only to the actions
of their previous counterpart. Suggesting that experienced information is weighted, rather than
simply attended, more than observed information, in experiment 2 they were able to accurately
recall observed actions and in experiment 3 they wrote down the actions of all players in all
dyads.
The fact that different sources of information are weighed in non-optimal ways has
important implications for economics. In many situation agents both observe and experience
information. For example, people receive information about the returns of stocks they invest in
and about stocks they do not invest in; they learn the consequences of diseases they experience
and of those they learn about from friends and relatives; they experience the consequences of
risks they take personally and observe the effects of risk-taking by other people. If they
systematically overweight directly experienced information, their decisions are likely to
systematically deviate from standard models of choice which assume they do not.
For example, although there has been ample experimental and theoretical work on the
existence of social preferences, this research provides little guidance in predicting how people
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decide what specific cause to provide assistance to in the real world. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that personal experience plays a large role: people appear much more likely to adhere to
social causes they have experienced directly. Although the anecdotal evidence could be caused
by confounds between social causes people experience and do not experience, recent
experimental work by Small and Simonsohn (2005), inspired in part by the results from this
paper, provides evidence consistent with the notion that personal experience causally shapes
preferences over the outcomes of others. They randomly assigned subjects to befriend a
“victim” (fellow subject who lost $10) or a non-victim, and found that subjects matched with
victims acted more generously towards other victims.
Another important instance in which a premium placed on experienced information could
have important economic consequences is when market conditions change. If people react more
strongly to experienced than to observed information, they may be slow to react to market
changes even if they are informed about these changes, as they may need to experience them
before being willing to act. For example, a seminal paper by Lucas (1973) proposes that
inflation can affect output if producers confuse changes in the aggregate level of prices with
changes in relative prices. One mechanism for this type of error (particularly in light of the fact
that inflation data is freely available) is that producers weigh price changes they experience
(those of their own product) too much, and those they learn about indirectly too little.
Consistent with such suboptimal weighting of information, (Simonsohn and Loewenstein,
2006) and (Simonsohn, 2006) find that movers between cities base their decision of how much to
spend on rent, and how long to commute in a city they have just moved to, respectively, at least
partially on the conditions they experienced on the previous city. When people move again
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within their new city, however, after having experienced local prices, they readjust fully undoing
the impact that previous conditions had.
As a final application, consider the common tendency of workers to load their retirement
portfolios with stocks of their own company – a strategy that makes little sense in terms of risk
diversification given the likely coincidence of job loss and poor performance by the company.
Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2005) studied the impact of the debacles at Enron, Global Crossing,
and Kmart on the investment of US workers at other firms in their employers' stock, and found it
to be negligible.
The results presented in this paper show that people tend to weigh experienced
information more heavily than observed experience. The recent evidence about how people
choose charities, and the results from our PD experiments suggest that probably the premium
given to experienced information is mediated by preferences.
This impact on preferences is probably mediated by emotions. Indeed, we have
difficulty imagining any other plausible explanation for such a differential reaction when
informational content is held constant. Future research could productively examine more
directly the role of emotions in producing differences in learning from experienced and observed
information.
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Table 1. Payoff structre for weak-link experiment
Minimum choice of other players
Player's Choice

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

7

130

110

90

70

50

30

10

6

120

120

100

80

60

40

20

5

110

110

110

90

70

50

30

4

100

100

100

100

80

60

40

3

90

90

90

90

90

70

50

2

80

80

80

80

80

80

60

1

70

70

70

70

70

70

70

Payoffs are in Swedish Crowns. When the experiment was conducted 1US$ = 8 SEK aprox.
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Table 2. Average group-minimum by round
Round

Average

SD

1

3.72

0.45

2

3.33

0.91

3

3.22

0.60

4

2.83

0.74

5

2.94

0.92

6

3.00

1.15

7

2.44

0.90

8

2.89

1.18

9

2.78

1.00

10

2.61

0.98
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Table 3. Weak-link game. Choice in k as a function of minima in round k-1 (Ordered Probit)a
Dependent Variable: Own choice (1-7) in round k

(1)

(2)

(3)

Only Experienced Experienced and Only Observed
Observed
Own choice in previuos round

(α1)

Minimum in Group 1 in previous round

(α2)

Minimum in Group 2 in previous round

(α3)

Minimum in Group 3 in previous round

(α4)

Minimum in own-group in previous round

(α5)

Round

(α6)

Was subject in group 1 in previous round? (1 or 0)

(α7)

Was subject in group 2 in previous round? (1 or 0)

(α8)

Number of observations

0.402***

0.382***

0.374***

(0.055)

(0.054)

(0.054)

--

0.040

0.062**

--

(0.034)

(0.031)

--

0.102***

0.122***

--

(0.033)

(0.028)

--

0.027

--

(0.033)

0.051*
(0.029)

0.119***

0.066**

--

(0.023)

(0.032)

--

-0.021

-0.016

-0.018

(0.013)

(0.014)

(0.013)

0.113

0.105

--

(0.097)

(0.097)

--

0.029

0.032

--

(0.106)

(0.105)

--

648

648

648

Clustered (by subject) standard errors reported in parenthesis below parameter estimates
*,**,*** significant at the 10%,5% and 1% level respectively
a

Six intercepts are estimated for Ordered Probit, but not reported in table
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Table 4. Cooperation Rates by Round in Experiments 2 and 3
Round

Experiment 2

Experiment 3

1

61.1%

63.3%

2

55.5%

51.7%

3

51.8%

55.0%

4

44.4%

55.0%

5

44.4%

40.0%

6

43.7%

36.6%
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Table 5. Regression analysis of cooperation in round k for Experiment 2 ( Probit)
Dependent variable: Cooperatedk (1 if self cooperated in round k , 0 otherwise)

(1)
a

Only Experienced

(2)

(3)

Experienced and

Only Observed

Observed
(Β0 )

Intercept
Cooperatedk-1 (1 if yes, 0 if no)

(Β1 )
(Β2 )

% of cooperatorsk-1
% of cooperatorsk-1 * Cooperatedk-1

(Β3 )

b

-0.612**

-0.963**

-1.071**

(0.295)

(0.421)

(0.429)

0.961***

1.155***

1.415***

(0.247)

(0.447)

(0.448)

--

0.636

0.562

--

(0.623)

(0.629)

--

-0.418

0.064

--

(0.794)

(0.759)

-0.444

--

Experienced Cooperator,k-1 (1 if yes, 0 if no)

(Β4 )

-0.427
(0.274)

(0.274)

--

Experienced Cooperator k-1*Cooperatedk-1

(Β5 )

1.159***

1.150***

--

(0.391)

(0.400)

--

Round

(Β6 )

0.001

0.011

-0.013

(0.050)

(0.051)

(0.049)

Joint Tests
Experienced information (B4 =0 and B5=0)
Observed information

(B2 =0 and B3=0)

Number of observations

p=.016

p=.021

--

--

p=.542

p=.301

270

270

270

p-values for two tailed tests are presented below parameter estimates (obtained with Clustered Standard Errors ).
a

Experienced information consists of the action of the player with whom the subject played on the previous round (1 if cooperated, 0 otherwise)

b

Observed information consists of the percentage players in other groups who cooperated in previous round

*,**,*** significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively
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Table 6. Regression analysis of cooperation in round k for Experiment 3 (Probit)
Dependent variable: Cooperatedk (1 if self cooperated in round k , 0 otherwise)

(1)
a

Only Experienced

(2)

(3)

Experienced and

Only Observed

Observed
(Β0 )

Intercept
Cooperatedk-1 (1 if yes, 0 if no)

(Β1 )

-0.070

-0.505

-0.594*

(0.270)

(0.377)

(0.355)

0.330
(0.237)

(Β2 )

% of cooperatorsk-1
% of cooperatorsk-1 * Cooperatedk-1
Experienced Cooperator,k-1 (1 if yes, 0 if no)

(Β3 )
(Β4 )

Experienced Cooperator k-1*Cooperatedk-1

(Β5 )

Round

(Β6 )

b

0.741*
(0.398)

1.297***
(0.361)

--

0.801

0.759

--

(0.494)

(0.479)

--

-0.778

-0.816

--

(0.650)

(0.610)

-0.160

-0.198

--

(0.230)

(0.238)

--

0.927***

0.965***

--

(0.311)

(0.318)

-0.095*

-0.092*

-0.085

(0.049)

(0.054)

(0.053)

p=.0004

p=.0004

--

--

p=.2667

p=.2836

300

300

300

--

Joint Tests
Experienced information (B4 =0 and B5=0)
Observed information

(B2 =0 and B3=0)

Number of observations

p-values for two tailed tests are presented below parameter estimates (obtained with Clustered Standard Errors ).
a

Experienced information consists of the action of the player with whom the subject played on the previous round (1 if cooperated, 0 otherwise)

b

Observed information consists of the percentage players in other groups who cooperated in previous round

*,**,*** significant at the 1%,5% and 10% level respectively
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Figure 1. Screen-shot of page where subjects make their [1-7] decision in each of 10 rounds
of the Weak-link experiment
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Figure 2. Screen-shot of page where subjects observe the decisions of all 12 players in each
round of the Weak-link experiment.
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Figure 3. Distribution of chosen numbers in WL games, rounds 1-10.
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Figure 4. R2’s obtained from regressing subjects’ actual choices on predicted choices from
three functions of imputed subjective probabilities, for the minimum in the next group, as a
function of the relative weighting of experienced and observed information (θ).
0.41
0.405
0.4
0.395

(i) b*, best-response

0.39
R2

(ii) E[min], expected
minimum

0.385

(iii) p(min=1)...p(min=7)

0.38
0.375
0.37
0.365
0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

5.5

Relative weight of experienced/observed
information (theta)
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Figure 5. Screen-shot of webpage where subjects decide in the PD game.
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Figure 6. Screenshot of webpage where subjects see the outcomes of the previous round.
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Figure 7. The impact of outcome in k-1 on cooperation rate in k
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Appendix 1 - Instructions for Weak-link experiment.
Note to the reader:
The experiments and all instructions were originally presented to subjects on a webpage.
The Weak-link experiment was run in Sweden. The instructions that follow are the original English
instructions which were translated into Swedish before the experiment took place.
Comments which were not present in the original instructions but which will help the reader better
understand them are included inside <parenthesis>

Page 1
This is an experiment about decision making. The decisions that you and other people you
interact with make will determine how much money you (and they) make in this experiment.
This money will be paid at the end of the experiment in private and in cash.
It is important that during the experiment you remain SILENT. If you have any questions, or
need assistance of any kind, RAISE YOUR HAND. DO NOT SPEAK. One of the experiment
administrators will come to you and you may whisper your question to him. If you talk, laugh,
exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and
appreciate your cooperation.
Continue <this was a link to the next page>
Page 2
You are about to participate in an experiment with 11 other people. The experiment will consist
of several rounds. In each round, every one of the participants is randomly assigned to one of
groups.
In each round, each group of players will play the game described below:
Each player will pick a number between 1 and 7 by clicking on a button on the table shown
below. Each player will receive an amount of money determined by their number and the lowest
other number chosen, as described by the table below. You will not be able to see anyone else's
choices until everybody has made their choice.
<here subjects saw the payoff table which is table 1 in this paper>
Continue <this was a link to the next page>
Page 3
Before you participate in the actual experiment, please solve the following two hypothetical
examples by indicating what the payoff would be for each of the participants. Once you type in
the correct answers to both, you will be able to begin.
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Note that all participants will need to solve these (same) examples before the session begins, so
you may have to wait a few minutes.
You should have a sheet of paper with the payoffs table that you saw in the previous page, you
will need it to figure out the appropriate payments. If you encounter difficulties please raise your
hand and the experimenter will assist you.
Example 1
Chosen number

Player 1

Player 2

Player 3

Player 4

6

6

6

6

Player 1

Player 2

Player 3

Player 4

3

5

4

6

Payoff
Example 2
Chosen number
Payoff

ANSWER

<when subjects clicked on the “answer” button, their answers were checked automatically. If
they were wrong, they were asked to try again until they answered them correctly. When all
subjects succeeded in answering these questions, the experiment begun. Figures 1 and 3 depict
the pages they saw as they participated in the experiment.>
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Appendix 2. - Instructions for Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiment (originally presented to
subjects on a webpage).
Page 1
This is an experiment about decision making. The decisions that you and other people you
interact with make will determine how much money you (and they) make in this experiment.
This money will be paid at the end of the experiment in private and in cash.
It is important that during the experiment you remain SILENT. If you have any questions, or
need assistance of any kind, RAISE YOUR HAND. DO NOT SPEAK. One of the experiment
administrators will come to you and you may whisper your question to him. If you talk, laugh,
exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and
appreciate your cooperation.
Continue <this was a link to the next page>
Page 2
You are about to participate in an experiment with <K> other people. The experiment will
consist of several rounds. In each round every one of the <K+1> participants is randomly
assigned to one of <(K+1)/2> groups.
Each group of 2 players will play the game that’s shown below. If both players choose A then
they both get $10, if one of them chooses A and the other B, the one choosing A gets $3 and the
one choosing B gets $12 and if they both choose B they both get $5.
Continue <this was a link to the next page>
Page 3
Once everybody has played, everybody will see what everybody else did. And then a new round
will begin.
In every round participant will be re-located to new groups.
After all rounds have been played, one of them will be chosen at random to count for real money.
If you have any questions please raise your hand and wait quietly for an administrator to assist
you. Otherwise click on the button below and wait for everybody else to be ready.
Continue <this was a link to the next page. When all subjects had clicked it the experiment
begun. Figures 4 and 5 replicate the pages they saw as they participated in the experiment.>
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